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Abstract
Timely detection of anomalous activity in wireless sensor network is critical for the smooth working of the network. This paper
presents an intrusion detection technique based on the calculation of trust of the neighboring node. In the proposed IDS, each node
observes the trust level of its neighboring nodes. Based on these trust values , neighboring nodes may be declared as trustworthy,
risky or malicious. Trustworthy nodes are recommended to the forwarding engine for packet forwarding purposes. The proposed
scheme successfully detects Hello ﬂood attack, jamming attack and selective forwarding attack by analyzing the network statistics
and malicious node behavior. The simulation results show that network performs better when neighbor node trust management
based anomaly detection technique is in place.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is an emerging notion and has gained enormous diligence of the research com-
munity due to increasing modernization of the technology. WSN is a self-organized network of large number of low
power and low cost sensor nodes1. These sensor nodes are light-weight and movable devices having capabilities of
sensing, communicating and processing the information to the targeted user. They have limited transmission range and
communicate directly with nodes lies within its transmission range. Communication with a far end node is performed
via intermediate node. Sensor networks are susceptible of exterior and interior outbreaks2 3 4. Motes often lacks the
ability of dealing a tough attacker owing to its resource constraints nature. In this case secondary level of defense
often called intrusion detection system is required5 6 7. Exploitation of eﬀorts by the attacker can be detected with the
help of intrusion detection system. The conﬁdence and faith of a node in the ability, consistency and trustworthiness
of other nodes is termed as trust8. Trust based on direct observation of a node is also called direct trust or ﬁrst-hand
information. A node’s observation and opinion about other nodes based on their earlier performances in an explicit
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perspective on a certain period of time is termed as reputation9 10 11. Reputation is also called indirect trust or second
hand information12 13 14. This paper elaborates a neighbor node trust calculation and evaluation based anomaly intru-
sion detection technique. Remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section II covers the related work. Section
III provides the detailed phases of the proposed scheme. It presents the system model and the initial observations of
the nodes in the network. Discussion about the components and blocks of the proposed solution is also carried out in
this section. Results are discussed in section IV. Finally, section V concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
The idea of trust computation based intrusion detection systems originates with the design of an IDS by Wang
et al. 15 for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) based on trust variations and chain of evidence. The assessment of
the network node is carried out periodically. A trust assessment and reputation interchangeability based intrusion
detection method is oﬀered by Ebinger et al. 16. The combination of reputation, trust and conﬁdence with trustwor-
thiness cause an improvement in the detection of intrusion. Various trust management mechanisms17 18 19 have also
been presented for WSN. The primary objectives of these techniques include security of systems and reliability of the
information. A trust based IDS is proposed by20 for cluster WSN. Cluster head (CH) performs the trust calculation
and evaluation of nodes present in the cluster. Honesty (social trust) and supportiveness as well as energy consump-
tions (quality of service trust) are the assessment metrics used by the authors for the absentness and identiﬁcation of
malicious activity. Base station evaluates the trust level of cluster head (CH). Fuzzy logic in combination of evidence
theory based IDS is presented in21. Behavior of nodes is observed and malicious nodes are identiﬁed by the valida-
tion process. An IDS for the localization and detection of the anomalies in WSN is presented by22. The decision
about the adversary is achieved by taking inference from the calculation and observation of the specially designated
measurement nodes. Malicious node detection based on the neighbor node calculation is carried out in23 24 25. In23,
information fabrication attack is detected. Spatial correlation is used in order to detect anomalous activity in neighbor-
ing nodes. In24, statistical distribution and high computational complexity of the nodes are the disadvantages of IDS.
In25 though, the cooperation between nodes makes this IDS robust, the main drawback is overhead due to communi-
cation. WSN requires a ﬂexible, light weight and an eﬀective IDS for the identiﬁcation of internal malicious nodes.
Therefore, a lightweight IDS is required. We present in this paper, a lightweight neighbor node trust calculation and
evaluation based anomaly intrusion detection technique.
3. The proposed IDS
Block diagram of proposed intrusion detection system is shown in ﬁgure 1. The proposed intrusion detection
system has a trust manager, which manage the direct and indirect trust (reputation) of a node. The behavior classiﬁer
classiﬁes the behavior of the node as attacker, trustworthy and risky based on the trust values and calculation obtained
from the trust manager. In case of the trustworthy behavior, the observed node is recommended to the forwarding
engine for packet forwarding. When behavior of the observed node is identiﬁed as risky, its risk factor is evaluated
and updated. If the observing node is willing to take risk, it recommends the observed node having risky behavior to
the forwarding engine for forwarding. This status of the observed node is saved in the recommendation data base. If
the observing node does not want to take risk, it stores the risk factor of the observed node in recommendation data
base. In case of attack behavior, the attack classiﬁer distinguishes attack pattern based on the calculation described in
the following subsections. The observed node is declined for forwarding purpose. The status of the observed nodes is
saved in the recommendation data base.
3.1. System Model and nodes Initial Observation
In the proposed IDS, a node y0 calculates the level of trust of its neighboring nodes. The neighbors of y0 is a set
of nodes having one hop contact with node y0 and are represented as Nb(y0)={y1......yn}. Any node yi possesses set of
attributes denoted as Ayi = {a1......an}. The activity of the node yi is observed by the sensor node y0 by observing its
individual attributes. The observed attributes of node yi are stored by the vector f yi={ f1yi..... fsyi} with every element
explaining the node’s activities in one feature. If node yi observes its neighboring nodes Nb(y0)={y1......yn}, it stores
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Fig. 1. Block Diagram of Proposed IDS
the set of the corresponding attribute vectors ANb(y0) = {Ay1 ......Ayn }. More precisely the attributes of any node include
Received Signal Strength, Packet Sending Rate, Control Packet Generating Rate, Packets Delivery Ratio, Packet
Dropping Rate, Packet Forwarding Rate and Packet Acknowledgment Rate. The amount of power in any radio signal
received is termed as Received Signal Strength. The Received Signal Strength of the node y observed by the node y0 is
represented as Ps(y). A node is considered malicious if it has high received signal strength than the vector of received
signal strength of its neighbors Nb(y0)={y1......yn}. In this case the node is considered to have undergone a Jamming
attack. Packet Generation Rate is the number of control packets generated in a speciﬁc interval of time. Pg(y) is
the Packet Generation Rate of node y monitored by the node y0. A node is considered malicious if it generates high
number of control packets than the vector of control packets generated by its neighbors Nb(y0)={y1......yn}. In this case,
the node is considered to have undergone a Hello Flood attack. Packet Receiving Rate is the total number of packets
received in a speciﬁc period of time. PRcR(y) is the Packet Receiving Rate of node y monitored by the node y0. In a
multi-hop scenario, a node forwards packets of its neighbors. The rate of packet received by a node and its subsequent
forwarding to its destination node is termed as Packet Forwarding Rate. PFrR(y) is the Packet Forwarding Rate of
node y monitored by the node y0. A node is said to be suﬀering selective forwarding attack if its packets forwarding
rate is much less than the packets forwarding rate of its neighbor Nb(y0)={y1......yn}. Node’s trust level is calculated
based on these attributes. There are three possibilities about the observed node i.e. a node may be trustworthy or it
may be a malicious or a risky node. These three kind of observations are saved in the recommendation data base of the
IDS. Trust is calculated by taking average of the direct trust A(y) and indirect trust i.e reputation B(y). Mathematically
T (y) = avg[A(y), B(y)]. The average of normal expected behavior of the neighboring nodes (T) is the required Trust
(RT).
3.2. Detection of Jamming Attack
Let Ps0(y) is the total Received Signal Strength of node y observed by node y0 during time interval T0. Ps1(y) is
the total Received Signal Strength of node y observed by node y0 during time interval T1 and Psz(y) is the total packet
sending rate of node y observed by node y0 during time interval Tz. let Psi(y) ) is the total Received Signal Strength
of node y observed by node y0 during time interval Ti. Then the average Received Signal Strength is calculated as
Psavg(y) =
∑z
t=1(t/z)[Pst(y)]. Now at any interval ’i’ if the Received Signal Strength is greater then the summation of
average Received Signal Strength and the Received Signal Strength values of the sensor speciﬁed in its data sheets,
node is suﬀering from jamming Attack. Mathematically,
Psi(y) > Psavg(y) +C (1)
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Where Psi(y) is the Received Signal Strength of node y at any given interval i observed by node y0. C is the Received
Signal Strength values of the sensor speciﬁed in its data sheets. Node for which equation 1 does not not hold true, are
malicious.
3.3. Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack
The packets forwarded successfully is the ratio in between the packet forwarding rate PFrR(y) and packet receiving
rate PRcR(y). The packets forwarded successfully by node y at any instant ’i’ observed by node y0 is given as Pf i(y) =
PFrR(y)
PRcR(y)
.
Let Pf i(y) is the total packets forwarded successfully by node y observed by node y0 during time interval T0. Pf 1(y)
is the total packets forwarded successfully by node y observed by node y0 during time interval T1 and Pf z(y) is the total
packets forwarded successfully by node y observed by node y0 during time interval Tz. let Pf i(y) is the total packets
forwarded successfully by node y observed by node y0 during time interval Ti. Then the average packets forwarded
successfully is calculated as Pf avg(y) =
∑z
t=1(t/z)[Pf t(y)]. Now at any interval ’i’ if the packets forwarded successfully
is greater then the summation of average of packets forwarded successfully, node is suﬀering from jamming Attack.
Mathematically,
Pf i(y) > Pf avg(y) (2)
Where Pf i(y) , in the above equation is the packets forwarded successfully by node y at any instant i observed by
node y0. PFrR(y) is the packet forwarding rate of the node y and PRcR(y) is the packet receiving rate of node y at any
particular interval. We can say that node for which equation 2 does not not hold true, are malicious.
3.4. Detection of HELLO Flood Attack
Let Pg0(y) is the control packets generating rate of node y observed by node y0 during time interval T0. Pg1(y) is
the packets generating rate of node y observed by node y0 during time interval T1 and Pgz(y) is the control packets
generating rate of node y observed by node y0 during time interval Tz. Let Pgi(y) ) is the control packets generating
rate of node y observed by node y0 during time interval Ti. Then the average control packets generating rate is given
as Pgavg(y) =
∑z
t=1(t/z)[Pgt(y)]. Now at any interval ’i’ if the control packets generating rate of any node is greater
then the summation of average control packets generating rate and the control packets generating rate values of the
sensor speciﬁed in the standard protocol, node is suﬀering from Hello Flood Attack. Mathematically
Pgi(y) > Pgavg(y) +C (3)
Where Pgi(y) is the control packets generating rate of node y at any given interval i observed by node y0 . C is
the control packets generating rate values of the sensor speciﬁed in the standard protocol it follow. Node for which
equation 3 does not hold true, are malicious and higher control packets generating rate is the identiﬁcation of hello
ﬂood attack.
3.5. Detection of Trustworthy (Good) Nodes
A node is said to be trustworthy or Good if its current Direct Trust value Ac(y) is greater or equal to the required
trust value RTv , meaning that it satisﬁes the condition Ac(y) ≥ RTv.
3.6. Detection of Risky Nodes
There are two possibilities about the risky nature of a node. In the ﬁrst case, there is no prior recommendation
about the node , that is B(y)=0 and its current direct trust value Ac(y) is less that the Required Trust Value RTv.
Mathematically: Ac(y) < RTv. In this case, the total trust is given as TTA(y) = Ac(y) + B(y) and as B(y)=0 so
TTA(y) = Ac(y). Then the value of risk is given as RA(y) = RTv − TTA(y)
RA(y) = RTv − TTA(y) (4)
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Fig. 2. Detection rate per 100 rounds along varying network size
In the second case, the recommendation value of the node is less than the value of Required Trust Value that is B(y) <
RTv and its current direct trust value Ac(y) is less that the Required Trust Value RTv. Mathematically Ac(y) < RTv. In
this case, the total trust is given as TTB(y) = Ac(y) + B(y). Then the value of risk is given by the following equation.
RB(y) = RTv − TTB(y) (5)
3.7. Storage of Node Status for future use (Reputation) and subsequent Forwarding Decision
Recommendation Data Base stores the status of the node. On the bases of calculation, a node may be found
malicious, trustworthy or risky. These statistics are used in the future interaction of the nodes. A trustworthy node
is recommended for interaction, a malicious node is declined, while decision about packet forwarding through risky
node is mad, if the node intending to send data is willing to take risk. After the successful determination of the node
status as malicious, trustworthy or risky, decision about the packet forwarding through any neighbor node is taken by
the packet sending node. The criteria for packet forwarding is the selection of safest path rather than selecting shortest
path.
4. Results and Discussion
The proposed intrusion detection system is implemented using MATLAB. Nodes were randomly deployed in an
area of 200 x 200 square meters. Simulations were performed for network size of 60, 80, 100, 120,140, 160, 180, and
200 nodes. For each network size, per 100 round results are discussed for the detection rate of the proposed IDS. The
detection rate of the proposed IDS is compared with the detection rate of23, 24 and25. Figure 2 shows that the average
detection rate of the proposed NeTMids is 0.8 which is better than the detection rate of23, 24 and25, due to the fact
that the proposed IDS distinguishes observed nodes as trustworthy, risky and malicious based on their trust values.
Also observing node does not solely depend on the observed node reputation but it also takes into consideration the
calculated values of its current trust.
5. Conclusion
We propose an intrusion detection technique based on the principal that nodes in each other neighborhood behave
in a similar way. The proposed NeTMids detects hello ﬂood, jamming and selective forwarding attack. It can be
further extended by including other attacks as well. Simulation results shows that network perform better when the
proposed NeTMids is deployed.
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